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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Victoria Morin was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter DUI), a 
violation of Idaho Code§ 18-800. A Request for Discovery was filed by the defense and in the 
State's Second Addendum to Discovery it disclosed Dr. Gary Dawson as an expert witness. The 
defense filed a Motion to Compel Discovery for a written summary or report of the expert 
testimony it expected to present and the facts and data underlying the expert's opinion upon 
which the expert would rely during his testimony. A Motion in Limine was also filed to exclude 
any reference to Carboxy-THC. A hearing was held at which time the trial court denied the 
defendant's motion to compel and provisionally denied the Motion in Limine. 
The case proceeded to a Jury Trial; at which time Ms. Morin was convicted by a jury of 
DUI. Ms. Morin timely filed her Notice of Appeal, the District Court heard argument and took 
the matter under advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
affirming the conviction upon which Ms. Morin now timely appeals. On appeal, Ms. Morin 
asserts that the trial court erred when it: 1) denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel thereby 
denying her of her Constitutional right to due process and a fair trial guaranteed to her by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution when it allowed testimony over objection regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's expert 
opinions which were never disclosed to the defense prior to trial; 2) denied Ms. Morin's Motion 
in Limine to exclude testimony and evidence regarding Carboxy-THC a simple metabolite of 
THC. 
1 
Statement of the Facts 
Victoria Morin's vehicle was stopped fully on the side of the road, out of a lane of travel 
when Trooper Jayne initiated his contact on February 24, 2012 at approximately 5:57 p.m. 
(6/23/13 Tr. p.217, Ls.23-25 - p.218, Ls.1-8). Ms. Morin's hazard lights were blinking, and 
Trooper Jayne observed no traffic or law violations. (6/23/13 Tr. p.217, Ls.23-25 -p.218, Ls.1-
8). Ms. Morin approached Trooper Jayne and advised him that her vehicle was out of gas, that 
incident response was on their way, and that she had called her sister. ( 6/23/13 Tr. p.218, Ls.20-
23). Trooper Jayne then began a DUI investigation. (6/23/13 Tr. p.219, Ls.1-4). 
During the initial encounter at the driver's side door, Trooper Jayne did not observe the 
odor of marijuana, nor did he observe glassy or bloodshot eyes. (6/23/13 Tr. p.221, Ls.1-11). 
Based on Trooper Jayne's observations, and the information provided by dispatch, he asked 
Ms. Morin to perform Field Sobriety Tests. (6/23/13 Tr. p.156, Ls.5-25)(6/23/13 Tr. p.159, 
Ls.19-21). Ms. Morin did not pass any of the tests and was placed under arrest for DUL 
(6/23/13 Tr. p.158, Ls.8-20). After Ms. Morin was placed in Trooper Jayne's vehicle for 
transport to jail, Trooper Jayne still did not observe the odor of marijuana. (6/23/13 Tr. p.221, 
Ls.11-15). 
After Ms. Morin was transported to jail, Trooper Jayne conducted a Drug Recognition 
Evaluation (hereinafter DRE). (6/23/13 Tr. p.186, Ls.1-6). As a result of the DRE, Trooper 
Jayne concluded that Ms. Morin was under the influence of Cannabis and unable to operate a 
motor vehicle safely. (6/23/13 Tr. p.206, Ls.15-18). Mr. Morin admitted to having used 
marijuana about a week earlier (6/23/13 Tr. p.207, Ls.1-2), and provided a blood sample. 
(6/23/13 Tr. p.209, Ls.1-3). Throughout the encounter, Ms. Morin was polite, cooperative, and 
did not argue about anything. (6/23/13 Tr. p.212, Ls.9-15). 
2 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel thereby denying 
her of her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution when the trial court allowed testimony over her objection 
regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's expert opinions, which were never disclosed to the 
defense prior to trial? 
II. Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion in Limine, which sought to 




The Trial Court Err When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion To Compel Thereby Denying Her Of 
Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial Guaranteed Under The Fourteenth 
Amendment To The United States Constitution And Article 1, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution 
When The Trial Court Allowed Testimony Over Her Objection Regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's 
Expert Opinions, Which Were Never Disclosed To The Defense Prior To Trial. 
A. Introduction 
When the Court denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel production of the information 
sought, it approved of the State's continuing violation ofldaho Criminal Rule 16. Furthermore, 
such error was not harmless, and the State should have been compelled pursuant to the rules of 
discovery to provide Ms. Morin with the underlying facts and data which would tend to 
substantiate Dr. Dawson's expert opinions. 
Ms. Morin was further denied her constitutional right to due process and a fair trial when 
over objection the trial court allowed Dr. Dawson to testify to expert opinions without any prior 
disclosure of those opinions and the underlying facts and data for those opinions. Therefore, Ms. 
Morin was unable to adequately challenge the evidence presented against her or adequately 
cross-examine Dr. Dawson 
B. Standard of Review 
The trial court's refusal to compel the State to disclose the expert opinion of Gary Dawson and 
the underlying facts and data for that opinion as well as the Court's decision to admit evidence is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729,731,240 P.3d 575,577 
(2010). Generally speaking, the lower court has sole discretion in deciding whether to admit or 
exclude evidence. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001). But, this 
discretion is not unlimited. The trial court must exercise reason in its decision making. Id. 
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Nonetheless, this "broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial will be reversed only 
where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion." Id. at 732, 24 P.3d at 49. 
In reviewing a discretionary decision of a trial court, this Court reviews the record to 
determine if the lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
bounds of discretion and consistently with any legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise ofreason. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918,923 (2010). 
1. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion To Compel The 
Opinions, And The Facts and Data Underlying The Opinions, Of The State's 
Expert Gary Dawson. 
The trial court erred when it denied Ms. Morin's motion to compel Dr. Dawson's expert 
opinion. The State is required by Idaho Criminal Rule 16 to disclose a written summary or 
report of the expert testimony it expects to present and the facts and data underlying the expert's 
opinion upon which the expert will rely during his testimony. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 (b )(7) provides: 
Upon written request of the defendant the prosecutor shall provide a 
written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce 
pursuant to Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or 
hearing. The summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, and the 
witness's qualifications. 
I.C.R. 16(b)(7) (emphases added). This is not an optional rule, or suggested practice, that the 
state can choose to follow or ignore. It is specifically laid out in the rules regarding discovery, 
and the defendant need only make a written request, which burden was satisfied when, in the 
original request for discovery, Ms. Morin requested: 
(8) [A] written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to 
introduce pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at 
trial or hearing; including the witnesses' opinions, the facts and data for those 
opinions, and the witnesses' qualifications. 
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(R., p.15). Rule 705 permits an expert to testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the 
reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data provided that the court 
may require otherwise, and provided further that, if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery, 
the underlying facts and data were disclosed. I.R.E. 705. 
A witness is qualified as an expert by his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
education, or other specialized knowledge. Id. The test for determining whether a witness is 
qualified as an expert is "not rigid" and can be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. West v. 
Sanke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39, 968 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1998). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
I.R.E. 702. 
This Court has observed, 
An "expert" in a court proceeding is someone possessing skill or 
knowledge beyond the competency of the average juror. Formal training or an 
advanced degree is not essential to qualify a witness as an expert, but practical 
experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within the 
category of "expert." 
IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 136, 142, 697 P.2d 1150, 1157 (1985) (emphasis 
added), overruled on other grounds by Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, l 08 
Idaho 757, 762, 702 P.2d 795, 800 (1985). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 indicates that expert witnesses may testify "in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise." I.RE. 702 (emphasis added). The term otherwise, as used in I.R.E. 702, 
indicates that the determination of whether a witness is an expert does not depend solely on 
whether he or she testifies to an opinion. Indeed, simply providing specialized knowledge to the 
trier of fact is enough to render a witness an expert under Rule 702. 
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In this case the only disclosure made by the state with regard to Dr. Dawson's testimony 
is as follows: 
Dr. Dawson is an expert in toxicology and pharmacology and will assist the trier 
of fact in understanding the evidence regarding the effects of drugs on the 
behavior and performance of the defendant as reported in this case. Dr. Dawson 
will utilize known and generally accepted scientific principles of absorption, 
distribution, metabolization and excretion of drugs. Testimony may include 
information on the effects of the drugs consumed by the defendant in this case and 
the possible effects of said drugs. 
(R., p.43) . (4/08/13 Motion Hr., p.15, Ls. 1-12). Because the trial court denied Ms. Morin's 
Motion to Compel, and the State was not required to provide a written report of Dr. Dawson 
including his opinions and the underlying facts and data upon which he relied, which would tend 
to substantiate his findings, Ms. Morin was unable to adequately defend herself against the 
state's accusations. Passages of Dr. Dawson's testimony are included below in Section 2 and are 
hereby incorporated by reference. This testimony was far greater than what the state's disclosure 
revealed. 
Ms. Morin was unable to challenge the evidence presented against her at trial and unable 
to adequately cross-examine Dr. Dawson or challenge any provided testimony. The State's 
minimal, non-specific disclosure was a discovery violation, and the trial courts denial of Ms. 
Morin's Motion to Compel was an abuse of discretion that does not pass the harmless error test. 
2. Ms. Morin Was Denied Her Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial 
Guaranteed Under The Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution 
And Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution When The Trial Court, Over Her 
Objection, Allowed Testimony Regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's Expert Opinions 
Which Were Never Disclosed To Her Prior To Trial 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and 
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capricious acts of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due process 
requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. 
of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). Due process also demands 
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Gray v. 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 182 (1996). Thus, due process is violated if a defendant is not 
afforded "a reasonable opportunity to meet [the charges] by way of defense or explanation." In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,275 (1948);see also State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684,690,217 P. 611, 
614 (1923) ("It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional guaranties as well as 
by numerous provisions of the statutes, to accord to every person accused of crime . . . every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and to vindicate his innocence upon a trial.") and 
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,239,220 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). 
When Dr. Dawson was called to testify, foundation was laid for his experience and 
training. (6/23/13 Tr. p.402-409). When the State began to ask questions regarding Ms. Morin's 
case, defense counsel objected and what follows is the colloquy between defense counsel and the 
Court: 
Q. Doctor, have you had opportunity to review the reports prepared by Corporal Jayne? 
[Defense] Judge, I'm just -
A Yes. 
[Defense] - going to, for the record, my standing objection to this doctor being able to 
testify with regards - with regards to pre-trial issues. And I'd like my standing objection 
to be heard based on the discovery rule violation, as well as due process for Victoria. 
I understand it's overruled, you - we said that, but I would like my standing objection 
just to be on the record with regard to any testimony that he's providing. 
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The Court: All right. That's noted for the record. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.409, Ls.23 - p.410, L.14.) 
Dr. Dawson testified as an expert at trial. (6/23/13 Tr. p.409, Ls.18-22).The following is 
testimony which was offered by Dr. Dawson with regard to his opinion as to whether Ms. Morin 
was impaired and unable to operate a motor vehicle safely: 
Q. Can you explain for the jury what carboxy THC is? 
A Carboxy THC is the inactive metabolite of tetrahydrocannibinol, which is one of the 
primary components in the marijuana leaf. 
A The other piece that it tells us is if we see it in the blood, that there's one of two 
possibilities. In chronic smokers, it can be persistent there. Smokers of marijuana, it 
could be there for some period of time. In infrequent smokers, it's more likely that 
the exposure was acute. 
Q. Explain that; what do you mean the exposure being more acute? 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.410, Ls.25 -p.411, L.24). 
Q. And you stated that Carboxy THC is an inactive metabolite? 
A Yes. 
Q. Does it have any effect on the body, on a person's ability to perform functions? 
A No. 
Q. But you stated that there are other indications that you look for to determine a 
window. What other indications would you be looking for? 
A There are a number of physical symptoms one would begin to look for in terms of 
indication of impairment. ... there might be other contributing factors as well. ... 
So, we would begin to look for physical signs and symptoms. . .. 
There's often problems with - with other aspects of cognitive function, which may 
have to do with the - the ability to think clearly, the ability to make decisions, short-
term memory loss, the ability to have a -- a - a conversation that is reflective of the 
current context within which the - the individual is being interviewed. It's not 
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unusual to see disconnective speech or though patterns that don't follow during that 
acute exposure. 
There's also the psychomotor function .... 
. . . -- a coating on the tongue, a green coating on the tongue, which would indicate 
reasonable recent exposure. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.413, Ls.2 - p.415, L.18). 
Q. Thank you. Additionally amphetamine was found in the defendant's blood. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you describe for the jury what amphetamine is? 
A. Amphetamine is a central nervous system stimulant. 
Q. Would they cancel each other out. 
A. Not necessarily because - there's - theres's a couple ofreasons, and we start getting 
- at - at the risk of getting too far out in the weeds here, I want - the - the 
amphetamine works at the one set of receptors. And the tetrahydrocannibinol works 
at the different set of receptors. 
Tachyphylaxis means you keep stimulating something long enough, it - its response 
to that stimulation goes away -- not -- it doesn't go away, but it becomes less 
noticeable. And in - in effect, its sort of - it's - it's sort of like a battery that if you 
keep flashing the light on and off, on and off, on and off, pretty soon it gets dimmer, 
and dimmer. And dimmer, and dimmer, and pretty soon it might stay on, but it's 
very, very dim compared to what it was at first. 
And so, that's - that's the effect that amphetamine has on nerve terminals. It causes 
the -- the neurotransmitters to be depleted over a period of time. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.424, Ls.8 - p.430, L.7). 
Q. Additionally, venlafaxine and nor-venlafaxine were reported in the blood. Can you 
describe those drugs? 
A. and so, that, in effect with taking Effexor as an anti-depressant, you're getting two 
for the price of one. So, as Effexor, the venlafaxine is metabolized to nor-
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venlafaxine in the body, not only is the Effex - the venlafaxine exerting an effect, its 
metabolite is active and its exerting an effect. 
Q. And the Effexor -- because it is an easier word to say -- is that a central nervous 
system depressant, or stimulant, or something different? 
A. In -- in -- in the sense of the -- the DRE exam, it falls within the category of CNS 
depressants. 
And so, the -- the issue with the central nervous system depressant, the gaze that we 
look at is one of the things we specifically identify as being associated with a central 
nervous system depressant, whether its alcohol, or narcotics, or sleeping pills, or 
whatever. It has to do with the motor control, the muscles that move the eye. 
Q. And you say there's been no reporting of Nystagmus with Effexor? 
A. I -- I am not aware of any, no. 
A. When you begin to add -- when you add medications together that exert similar 
effects in -- in the brain, in terms of -- of depressant effects, you get something -- a 
phenomenon we know as -- as an additive effect. 
(6/24/13 Tr., p.421, Ls. I - p.423, L.2 
Ms. Morin contends that the trial court erred when it allowed testimony from Dr. Gary 
Dawson regarding his opinions when those opinions were not disclosed to the defense prior to 
trial and of even more importance Dr. Dawson could not provide the facts and data upon which 
his expert testimony was based. At trial, Dr. Gary Dawson, offered the following testimony 
regarding the facts and data underlying his opinion: 
Q. You didn't provide a written summary or report with regard to the testimony that 
you're providing today? 
[State] Objection, Your Honor; relevance. May we have a side bar. 
The Court: Step up, Counsel. 
(Bench Conference) 
The Court: I'll overrule the objection. 
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[Defense Counsel] You didn't re - prepare or provide a written report to this - in this 
case? 
A. No. 
Q. And so, no information with regards to any studies, or scientifically peer reviewed 
studies. Or anything like that were provided to the defense with regard to what your 
opinions rely on? 
A. No. 
Q. And you haven't provided or made reference to any scientific basis for your opinions 
today? 
A. No. 
(6/24/12 Tr., p.437, Ls.18 -p.438, L.13). 
The District Court held that the "state should have been required to provide a more 
complete disclosure to Ms. Morin concerning Dr. Dawson's testimony. However, the court also 
finds that while Judge Gardunia did err in denying the Motion to Compel, Ms. Morin has not 
demonstrated that her substantial rights were violated." (R., p.208) The District Court applied 
the incorrect standard as Ms. Morin is not required to demonstrate that her substantial rights were 
violated. Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, the 
appellate court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test. State v. Almaraz, 154 
Idaho 584, 598, 301 p.3d 242, 256 (2013). If the appellate court finds that the district court 
erred, then the appellate court must declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not affect the outcome of the trial, in order to find that the error was harmless and not reversible. 
Id. Therefore because the district court erred in its analysis and in fact found an abuse of 
discretion, a reversal is necessitated, unless that State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. 
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Dr. Dawson's testimony regarding all of the above was more than just known and 
generally accepted scientific principles of absorption, distribution, metabolization, and excretion 
of drugs. This testimony was unsupported by any scientific studies or peer reviewed studies, or 
journal articles and, even after questioning by the defense, Dr. Dawson could not name or 
provide the relevant data and science behind his opinions. One of the most alarming issues is 
Dr. Dawson's testimony specifically about a drug called Effexor and how that one specific 
central nervous system depressant is not known to cause HGN. (6/23/13 Tr. p.429, Ls.12-14). 
Yet he could provide no scientific data to back that claim up and Trooper Jayne who is a certified 
Drug Recognition Evaluator testified that all CNS depressants cause HGN and that it is very 
similar to alcohol. (6/23/13 Tr. p.310, Ls.3-25-p.312, Ls. 1-25). 
Dr Dawson's entire testimony was an attempt by the State to prove guilt by whatever 
means necessary. In essence the expert was allowed to get on the stand and testify as to 
anything he wants, or anything which would tend to make the State's case stronger, without 
writing a report and providing the underlying facts and data which would support those opinions, 
making it impossible for the defense to properly cross examine him - or obtain an expert of her 
own to contradict his unknown testimony - because Ms. Morin had no idea what his testimony 
was going to be. The State was permitted to present undisclosed evidence against Ms. Morin, in 
blatant violation of Ms. Morin's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. This is the 
type of trial-by-ambush that was supposed to be eliminated by the adoption of the rules of 
discovery. 
While the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, it failed to act within 
the legal standards applicable and the trial court did not come to the conclusion by an exercise of 
reason. As part of this exercise, the trial court is required to weigh the prejudice that may affect 
13 
the party suffering from the non-disclosure, and in this case, the trial court did not weigh the 
prejudice against Ms. Morin, thereby further abusing its discretion. 
Because the trial court denied Ms. Morin's Motion to Compel and the State was not 
required to provide a written report of Dr. Dawson including the underlying facts and data upon 
which he relied and because the defense objected to all testimony from Dr. Dawson, Ms. Morin 
was unable to adequately defend herself against the State's case. Ms. Morin was unable to 
challenge the evidence presented against her at trial and unable to adequately cross-examine 
Dr. Dawson or even meaningfully challenge any provided testimony because the defense did not 
have an opportunity to present a report to its own expert or conduct adequate preparation for 
meaningful cross-examination. Because the trial court abused its discretion, depriving her of her 
constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, and the District Court erred in its analysis 
regarding a substantial prejudice, the State is unable to establish that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ms. Morin's conviction should be vacated, with the matter 
remanded for a new trial. 
IL 
The Trial Court Err When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion In Limine, Which Sought To Exclude 
All Testimony Regarding Carboxy-THC, A Simple Metabolite Of THC 
A. Introduction 
Because Carboxy-THC is, by law, not an intoxicant, all testimony and evidence of 
intoxication due to Carboxy-THC, namely the lab test result confirming the presence of 
Carboxy-THC in Ms. Morin's blood and opinion evidence from Trooper Jayne and Dr. Dawson 
that Ms. Morin was under the influence or impaired due to the presence of Carboxy-THC, should 
have been excluded. 
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B. Standard of Review 
A trial court has discretion in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, and its 
decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521 (2003); 
State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 683, 290 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Ct.App.2012). In reviewing a 
discretionary decision of a trial court, this Court reviews the record to determine if the lower 
court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the bounds of discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Morin's Motion In Limine, Which Sought To 
Exclude All Testimony Regarding Carboxy-THC, A Simple Metabolite Of THC 
Mr. Morin was charged with violating Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 ), which makes it 
unlawful to "drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle" while "under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance .... " LC. § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis 
added). According to the evidence, one of the substances found in Ms. Morin's blood was 
Carboxy-THC. As a matter of law, Carboxy-THC is not an intoxicating substance. See Idaho 
Transp. Dep 't v. Reisnauer, 145 Idaho 948 (2008). Thus, the presence of Carboxy-THC in 
Ms. Morin's blood is not relevant to the charge of driving ''under the influence of alcohol, drugs 
or any other intoxicating substances," and evidence of the presence of Carboxy-THC in 
Ms. Morin's blood should have been excluded. See I.R.E. 401 (defining relevant evidence); 
I.R.E. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). Similarly, any opinion evidence 
from a police officer, lab personnel, or other witness that Ms. Morin was unable to operate a 
vehicle safely because she was under the influence of cannabis should have been excluded 
because there is no recognized scientific basis to support such an opinion and such opinion 
evidence accordingly would be without foundation and not relevant to any facts at issue in the 
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case. See I.R.E. 401, 402, 403, 702. Finally, because Carboxy-THC is not intoxicating, there 
can be no inference that any impairment observed by the officer was caused by Carboxy-THC, 
and accordingly, any testimony or other evidence regarding any observations of impairment must 
be excluded. 
In Reisenauer, the Court addressed the presence of Carboxy-THC in the context of an 
administrative license suspension. The Court held that Carboxy-THC "is not in and of itself a 
drug" and that "it is only a metabolite of a drug." Reisenauer, 145 Idaho at 950-51. Thus, the 
presence of Carboxy-THC "in a urine sample is no evidence of the presence of any drug" and 
"there clearly was not substantial competent evidence [the defendant] failed an evidentiary test 
for drugs." Id. at 951. As the Court explained, "the drug that must be present also must be 
intoxicating." Id. (emphasis in original). Because the Department of Transportation had "not 
alleged or proved that Carboxy-THC is intoxicating, and since the test results revealed only the 
presence of Carboxy-THC, [the defendant] met his burden of proving that the results did not 
show the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances." Id. 
The holding in Reisenauer is that the presence of a substance in a defendant's blood is 
relevant under Idaho's DUI statutes only if that substance is intoxicating, and (2) holds that an 
officer's observations of a defendant's impairment support an inference that the impairment is 
caused by a substance found in the defendant's blood only when there is separate proof that the 
substance is intoxicating. 
In the most recent case to consider the issue of Carboxy-THC -the Court of Appeals 
held, "Because the toxicology report indicated the presence of Carboxy-THC, but not THC, it 
was, in essence, a negative drug test. The State did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
marijuana intoxication at the time Stark was driving. State v. Stark, 2013 WL 1338841 (Ct.App. 
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2013). It further held, "Although the State proved that Stark was impaired, and that he had used 
marijuana at some point in the past, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove 
that Stark's impairment was caused by Stark's past marijuana use." Id. Finally, the Court held, 
"While it may be possible, through the use of expert testimony, to demonstrate that a person is 
under the influence of an unknown drug or intoxicating substance that does not appear on a 
toxicology report, the State did not present such testimony in this case. We again emphasize that 
the toxicology report did not reveal the presence of an intoxicating drug or substance, which, 
together with evidence of Stark's impairment, would almost certainly have been sufficient to 
prove a violation of section 18-8004 under the totality of the evidence method of proof" Id. 
In the present case, one of the substances found in Ms. Morin's blood, Carboxy-THC, is 
not intoxicating. Thus, the presence of Carboxy-THC is not relevant and such evidence should 
have been excluded. Further, because Carboxy-THC is not intoxicating, there can be no 
inference that any observations of impairment was caused by the Carboxy-THC. 
Courts from other states have also held that Carboxy-THC is not an intoxicant and that 
the presence of Carboxy-THC does not demonstrate that an individual is under the influence of 
an intoxicant. In People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 2010), the Supreme Court of 
Michigan vacated a defendant's conviction under Michigan's DUI laws, holding that Carboxy-
THC is not an intoxicant, "has no known pharmacological effect," and that a "person cannot be 
prosecuted" under the DUI laws "for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of' Carboxy-
THC "in his or her system." Id. at 83. In so holding, the court noted "no federal court has held 
that [Carboxy-THC] is a controlled substance." Id. at 81. In Spires v. Raymond Westbrook 
Logging, 997 So.2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 2008), the Court of Appeals of Louisiana held, in the 
context of a worker's compensation benefits determination, that "intoxication" was not 
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established where the toxicology report showed the presence of Carboxy-THC, "the 
nonpsychoactive metabolite of THC," because "Carboxy THC is not an indicator of 
intoxication." Id. at 176, 179. 
Because Carboxy-THC is not, as a matter of law, an intoxicant, the presence of Carboxy-
THC in Ms. Morin's blood was not relevant to the charge against her of driving ''under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances." LC. 18-8004(1 ). Evidence of 
the presence of Carboxy-THC in Ms. Morin's blood should have been excluded. Similarly, any 
opinion evidence from a police officer, lab personnel, or other witness that Ms. Morin was 
driving under the influence of an intoxicant based on the presence of Carboxy-THC in her blood 
must be excluded because there is no recognized scientific basis to support such an opinion and 
such opinion evidence accordingly would be without foundation and not relevant to any facts at 
issue in the case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Morin respectfully requests that this court vacate her 
judgment of conviction and dismiss the case with prejudice as a sanction for the State's blatant 
disregard for the rules of discovery as well as the constitutional rights of Ms. Morin. In the 
alternative, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand her case for a new 
trial. 
DATED this 18th day of August 2014. 
HEIDI J-~SON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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